JURISDICTION AND NOTICE IN CLASS ACTIONS:
"PLAYING FAIR" WITH NATIONAL CLASSES
INTRODUCTION

The due process clause, "one of the murkiest constitutional mandates,"' tempts legal practitioners, judges, and scholars to grasp for
words to give content to this constitutional enigma. The further temptation is to equate such secondary language-whether in the form of an
explanatory phrase, formula, or many-pronged test-with due process
itself and to apply it in new contexts without focusing on its original
content. It is easy to lose sight of the fact that "due process is flexible
and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands." 2
The contours of due process are particularly murky in the class
action area. Here, the conflict between plaintiff classes and individual
defendants' reflects an underlying clash of philosophies "between the
traditional individualism theory of litigation, which requires individual
initiative to authorize passive judicial remedies, and a new, active protection theory,"" which "allows a stranger, a lawyer, and a court to
initiate [an] action ' 5 on behalf of a passive class of plaintiffs. To complicate matters further, the class action mechanism may serve one or
more functions: to deter unfair or illegal conduct on the part of businesses and government agencies, to disgorge unjustly realized profits, or
to compensate victims. Additionally, both the size of the class and scope
of relief may vary considerably. Contrast, for example, the antitrust
class action, implicating perhaps millions of consumers, each with a
claim of only a few dollars, with the employment discrimination suit
brought on behalf of fewer than a hundred employees, each of whom
has a claim for substantial backpay in addition to an equitable demand
for changes in hiring and promotion practices.
1 Lewis, The Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in
theJurisprudenceof PersonalJurisdiction,58 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 699, 732 (1983).
2 Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
1 There also exists the possibility of a dispute between individual or class plaintiffs and a class of defendants. Consideration of the due process concerns of defendant
class members, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment. But see generally Wolfson, Defendant Class Actions, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 459 (1977); Note, Defendant Class
Actions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 630 (1978); Note, PersonalJurisdiction and Rule 23 Defendant Class Actions; 53 IND. L.J. 841 (1978).
4 Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right to Opt Out, 25 AIuz. L. REv. 3, 27 (1983).
5 Id. at 26.
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In light of the complexity and far-reaching impact of class actions,
it is not surprising that the due process interests of class members have
preoccupied jurists and commentators. Most acknowledge differences
between individual and class litigation and note the variety of forms a
class action may take depending on the size of the class and the nature
of the relief sought. Nonetheless, there is a tendency to import into class
litigation the due process requirements developed in the ifndividual litigation context and to apply these touchstones uniformly to plaintiff
members of class actions, regardless of the different due process considerations different types of class actions may involve. Thus, such due
process concepts as minimum contacts6 and notice and opportunity to
be heard 7 often appear in class action opinions' and journal articles 9
See infra text accompanying notes 30-36.
See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
8 On minimum contacts, see, e.g., Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 526 F. Supp. 887,
909 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
817 (1983); Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 11-13, 428 N.E.2d 478, 480-81 (1981),
cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1982) (per curiam); Shutts
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 541-43, 567 P.2d 1292, 1304-05 (1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 89-91,
362 A.2d 1177, 1180 (App. Div. 1976); Katz v. NVF Co., 119 Misc. 2d 48, 54-55, 462
N.Y.S.2d 975, 979-80 (Sup. Ct. 1983); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d
226, 241-43, 271 N.W.2d 879, 886-87 (1978).
On notice, see, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th
Cir. 1979); Larionoff v. United States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1184-86 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affd,
431 U.S. 864 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 255-57 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 97073, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 383-85 (1975); Frank v. Teachers Inc. & Annuity Ass'n of
Am., 71 Ill. 2d 583, 593-94, 376 N.E.2d 1377, 1381-82 (1978); Metropolitan New
Orleans Chapter of the La. Consumers' League, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 391
So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1980).
9 On minimum contacts, see, e.g., Ross, Multistate Consumer Class Actions in
Illinois, 57 CH. KENT. L. REV. 397 (1981); Note, Mechanical and Constitutional
Problems in the Certification of Mandatory MultistateMass Tort Class Actions Under
Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517 (1983); Note, Illinois Multistate PlaintiffClass
Actions: Abrogation ofJurisdictionalLimitations on State Sovereignty - Miner v. Gillette Co., 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 471 (1982); Note, PersonalJurisdictionand Multistate
PlaintiffClass Actions: The Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32
DRAKE L. REV. 441 (1982-83); Note, Multistate PlaintiffClass Actions: Jurisdiction
and Certification,92 HARV. L. REV. 718 (1979); Note, Consumer Class Actions with a
Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1411 (1974); Note,
Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State CourtJurisdictionover Class Actions, 56 TEx.
L. REv. 1033 (1978); Comment, Expanding the Impact of State Court Class Action
6

Adjudications to Provide an Effective Forum for Consumers, 18 UCLA L. REv. 1002
(1971); Comment, Civil Procedure:In PersonqmJurisdictionover Nonresident Plaintiffs in Multistate Class Actions, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 382 (1978).
On notice, see, e.g., Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT.
REV. 97; Degnan, The Supreme Court of California, 1970-1971-Foreword: Adequacy of Representation in Class Actions, 60 CALiF. L. REv. 705 (1972); Fisch, Notice,
Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri'sNew Common-Question Class Action,
38 Mo. L. REV. 173 (1973); Kennedy, supra note 4; McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance - Class Action

1984]

CLASS ACTIONS

1489

but seldom are accompanied by an examination of how well the functions of such traditional. due process concepts match the due process
interests of plaintiff class members. This Comment undertakes such an
examination.
The class action label applies to a wide variety of cases, ranging
from mass tort actions involving individual claims of millions of dollars
to small-claim consumer actions in which the individual stakes are negligible. This Comment argues that the constitutional interests of plaintiff class members bringing damage actions vary according to the size of
their individual claims and that, therefore, the constitutional protection
afforded plaintiff class members should vary to reflect those different
interests. Thus, the larger the individual claims of plaintiff class members, the greater the interest each member will have in the suit, and the
more demanding should be the requirements of due process. Conversely, the smaller the individual claims of plaintiff class members, the
less the interest each member will have, and the less stringent should be
the requirements of due process.
To set the stage, the first section of part I discusses the personal
jurisdiction and notice requirements that have been imposed upon or
recommended for class actions. Then, shifting to the context of singleparty litigation, the next section outlines the specific requirements that
have been articulated in the name of the traditional concepts of personal jurisdiction and prejudgment notice. The Comment then examines the constitutional interests that these requirements are intended to
serve.
Having identified the interests that enlighten the due process requirements of personal jurisdiction and notice, the Comment considers
in part II the import of these interests for class actions. Specifically, the
part asks whether these interests support transplanting into the class
action context the standards used in the traditional single-party context.
The first section considers the appropriateness of personal jurisdiction
requirements over absent class plaintiffs for differing types of class actions. It concludes that the traditional notions of personal jurisdiction
are not suitable for many types of class actions. The second section
Issues, 25 HASTNGS L.J. 1351 (1974); Miller, Problems of Giving Notice in Class
Actions, 58 F.R.D. 313 (1973); Rutherglen, Notice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII
Class Actions, 69 VA. L. Ruv. 11 (1983); Comment, Can Due Process Be Satisfied by
DiscretionaryNotice in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CPRGHTON L. REv. 268 (1971);

Comment, Notice in Rule 23(bX2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1236 (1980); Comment, The Importance of

Being Adequate: Due Process Requirements in Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23,
123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217 (1975); Case Comment, Class Actions: Certification and
Notice Requirements, 68 GEo. L.J. 1009 (1980).
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looks to the appropriateness of prejudgment notice to class plaintiffs
and concludes that traditional prejudgment notice is not necessary for
all class actions. Finally, the last section points to protections available
to plaintiff class members in those cases where the Comment has concluded that the traditional safeguards are unjustified.
I.

A.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NOTICE:
TOUCHSTONES OF DUE PROCESS?

Due Process Rights in Class Actions

In the conventional class action-a suit brought against individual
defendants on behalf of a large number of plaintiffs-the extent to
which the constitutional procedural due process requirements of personal jurisdiction and prejudgment notice apply to absent class plaintiffs is unsettled. The Supreme Court has denied1" or dismissed 1 certiorari on the issue of personal jurisdiction, and it has not decided
whether prejudgment notice to absent class members is constitutionally
required."
Opinions vary on the constitutional necessity of personal jurisdiction over absent members of a plaintiff class. While some courts and
commentators have assumed that the same minimum contacts that are
required between a defendant and the forum in a traditional non-class
suit 13 must exist between the absent class member and the forum, 4
10 See Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 830 (1983); In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 342 (1982); Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292
(1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
" See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted,
456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1982) (per curiam).
11 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), held that individual prejudgment notice to members of a federal Rule 23(b)(3) class was required under subsection (c)(2) of the Rule, not that it was constitutionally required. Id. at 173-75. The
Court has never held that notice to members of Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) classes is required, even by the Rule itself.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 24-36.
14 See, e.g., Spirek v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 65 Ill. App. 3d 440, 382
N.E.2d 111 (1978); Feldman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 143 N.J. Super. 84, 362 A.2d 1177
(App. Div. 1976); Scher, Uniform Class Actions: A Critical View, 63 A.B.A. J. 840,
842 (1977); Note, PersonalJurisdictionand Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: The
Impact of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 32 DRAKE L. REv. 441 (198283); Note, Multistate PlaintiffClass Actions: Jurisdictionand Certification, 92 HAuv.
L. Rxv. 718, 730-31 (1979); cf.Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 526 F. Supp. 887, 909
(N.D. Cal. 1981), ("'minimum contacts' test[] . . .varies with the measure of values
affected, the costs inflicted by failure to exercise jurisdiction and the facts of each
case"); vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S.Ct.
817 (1983); Katz v. NVF Co., 119 Misc. 2d 48, 54, 462 N.Y.S.2d 975, 979-80 (Sup.
Ct. 1983) ("liberal approach" to minimum contacts applied, "taking into consideration
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others would require only some relationship between the forum and the
subject of the class litigation,1 5 and a third group would not impose
either a minimum contacts or a forum interest limitation." Rejecting
the jurisdictional requirements traditionally imposed on individual parties, this third group argues that in a class action the due process interests of absent plaintiff class members are adequately protected by the
7
class representative and the court.1
Similarly, views on the constitutional necessity of notice to absent
class members vary from those that would, like traditional approaches
to non-class suits,' 8 require prejudgment notice in all cases "9 to those
the parties, the relief requested and the unavailability of a more suitable forum"); Note,

Mechanical and ConstitutionalProblems in the Certificationof Mandatory Multistate
Mass Tort Class Actions Under Rule 23, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 517, 544-45 (1983)
(author questions appropriateness of contacts usually "counted" under "minimum contacts" analysis); see also UNIF. CLASS ACTIONS RULE § 6, 12 U.L.A. 26 (Sup. 1984).
The Act provides for the exercise of jurisdiction "over any person who is a member of
the class suing or being sued if a basis for jurisdiction exists or would exist in a suit
against the person under the law of this State." It also permits jurisdiction over nonresident class members if their state of residence has consented, through reciprocal legislation, for example. Id.
"5 See, e.g. Fisch, Notice, Costs, and the Effect of Judgment in Missouri's New
Common-Question Class Action, 38 Mo. L. REv. 173, 209-10 (1973); Tournquist,
Roadmap to Illinois Class Actions, 5 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 45, 57 (1974); Developments

in the Law

-

Multi arty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REv. 874,

940 (1958); Note, Illinois Multistate Plaintiff Class Actions: Abrogation of Jurisdictional Limitations on State Sovereignty - Miner v. Gillette Co., 31 DE PAUL L. REv.
471, 477-83 (1982); Note, Toward a Policy-Based Theory of State Court Jurisdiction
over Class Actions, 56 TEx. L. REv. 1033, 1040-41 (1978).
1" See Miner v. Gillette Co., 87 Ill. 2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478 (1981), cert. granted,
456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1982) (per curiam); Shutts v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567 P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068
(1978); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 271 N.W.2d 879 (1978);
H. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 1206a (1980 Supp.); Ross, Multistate
Consumer Class Actions in Illinois, 57 Cm. KENT L. REv. 397, 400, 407-12 (1981);

Note, Consumer Class Actions with a Multistate Class; A Problem ofJurisdiction,25
HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1436-37 (1974); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDG§ 41(2) & comment f (1980) ("A person represented by a party to an action is
bound by the judgment even though the person himself ... is not subject to service of
process . . ).
1" See Miner v. Gillette Co, 87 Ill. 2d 7, 14, 428 N.E.2d 478, 482 (1981), cert.
granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 484 (1982); Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 242, 271 N.W.2d 879, 887 (1978); H. NEWBERG, supra
note 16, at § 1206b; see also Shutts v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 547, 567
P.2d 1292, 1308 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1068 (1978).
IS See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Schrader v. Selective System Local Bd. No. 76, 470 F.2d 73, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1085 (1972); Metropolitian New Orleans Chapter of the La. Consumers' League, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 391 So. 2d 878 (La. Ct. App. 1980);
Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben Hur, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 327, 344 (1948);
Ross, supra note 16, at 410-11 (quoting Comment, Consumer Class Actions with a
Multistate Class: A Problem of Jurisdiction, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1411, 1432 (1974));
Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II: Considerationsof Procedure,49 B.U.L.
MENTs
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that would require it only in some cases 20 or not at all.21 Like those
who would reject traditional jurisdictional requirements for absent
plaintiff class members, those who would dispense with the requirement of prejudgment notice to absent class members assume that the
due process interests of the class would be adequately protected by the
class representative and the court.22
A third approach, advocated by Professor John Kennedy, would
merge jurisdiction and notice requirements. Kennedy argues that, at
least in cases where class members have the right to opt out of the class,
notice can constitute a waiver of jurisdictional objections from those absent class members who do not respond, thereby conferring jurisdiction
on the court by default. 28 This approach rejects the traditional view
that neither jurisdiction nor notice can substitute for the other.
Thus, theories of procedural due process in the class action context
can range far from those approaches developed in the context of singleparty litigation. While recognizing the merit of each of these theories
for certain types of class actions, this Comment argues that none is
sufficient for all types of class actions.
Courts developed the procedural due process safeguards of personal jurisdiction and notice for the protection of individual defendants.
REv. 407, 442 (1969); Comment, Can Due ProcessBe Satisfied by DiscretionaryNotice
in Federal Class Actions?, 4 CREIGHTON L. REv. 268, 295-99 (1971).

20 See, e.g., Johnson v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979);
Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 71 Ill. 2d 583, 593, 376 N.E.2d
1377, 1381 (1978); J. MOORE & J. KENNEDY, 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.55 nn.9-12 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1982); H. NEWBERG, supra note 16, at §
2570 (1977); Degnan, Adequate Representation in Class Actions, 60 CALIF. L. REv.
705, 718 (1972); Fisch, supra note 15, at 197; Homberger, State Class Actions and the
Federal Rule, 71 COLuM. L. REv. 609, 645-46 (1971); Maraist & Sharp, Federal
Procedure'sTroubled Marriage:Due Process and the Class Action, 49 TEx. L. REv.
1, 19-22 (1970); Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318,

1413-16 (1976); Comment, Notice in Rule 23(bX2) Class Actionsfor Monetary ReliefJohnson v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. REv. 1236, 1257 (1980); Comment,

The Importance of Being Adequate: Due ProcessRequirements in Class Actions Under
Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1217, 1240-41 (1975); Comment, Adequate

Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 889, 911 (1968).
"I Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 97, 121-26
(proposing a return to one-way intervention, as well as elimination of the notice re-

quirement); cf Berry, Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperativefor
Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 299, 326-27
& n.188 (1980) (advocating provision of Senate bill for reform of federal class damage
action, which would require no notice in "deterrence-oriented public actions" involving
200 or more class members and individual claims of $300 or less).
2" See cases and authorities cited supra note 20.
28 Kennedy, supra note 4, at 39-41. Under Kennedy's approach, judgments entered pursuant to notice-created jurisdiction are subject to collateral attack by a nonresident class member who later asserts that the original forum had no power to impose the
duty to opt out of the action.
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To the extent that the interests of members of plaintiff classes resemble
those of individual defendants, it makes sense to transplant defendant
safeguards into the class action context. However, the less the similarity
between class members' interests and individual defendant interests, the
less the justification for imposing upon class action plaintiffs restrictions
designed to serve the interests of individual defendants. This Comment
advocates an approach that would pierce the class characterization and
would allow the requirements of due process to vary according to the
similarity of interests of plaintiff class members to those of individual
defendants.
The next section of the Comment examines the specific requirements arising from the procedural due process concepts of personal jurisdiction and prejudgment notice as those requirements have developed
in the context of traditional single-party litigation. The constitutional
interests supporting these requirements are then considered; these interests will be the basis for the analysis in part II, which considers, in
light of these interests, the procedural due process requirements appropriate for class actions.
B. Due Process in Single-Party Litigation
The limits on the powers of states to assert jurisdiction over individual defendants have expanded beyond the rigid bounds of territoriality and residence to the flexible requirement of "minimum contacts." In
1878 the Supreme Court held in Pennoyer v. Neff' that a state's sovereign power was confined by the physical boundaries of the state-only
residents, or persons who were found within the state or who submitted
themselves voluntarily to the state's jurisdiction by appearing in court,
could be bound by a judgment.2" But with the expansion of multistate
commerce and the general increase in mobility, territorial restraints on
jurisdiction became inadequate.2" Domicile, 7 implied consent,2 and
24

25

95 U.S. 714 (1878).

Id. at 720.

28 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 220-23 (1957); see also
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEmURE: CIL §§ 10641072 (1969).
27 See, e.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) ("Domicile in the state
is alone sufficient to bring an absent defendant within the reach of the state's jurisdiction for purposes of a personal judgment by means of appropriate substituted service.").
28 See, e.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938) (upholding a state rule of procedure by which a personal judgment could be rendered in a cross-action against a plaintiff in the state's courts); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (upholding a Massachusetts statute under which the operation by a nonresident of a motor vehicle on a
public way of the commonwealth was equivalent to an appointment by the nonresident
of the commonwealth's registrar of motor vehicles as his agent for service of process in
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constructive presence 29 were accepted as bases for jurisdiction. Finally,
in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,"0 handed down in 1945, the
Court declared that a state court could assert jurisdiction over persons
who had "certain minimum contacts" with the territory of the forum."1
Subsequent cases have affirmed the International Shoe minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction. 2
The requirement that a party sought to be joined in an action have
minimum contacts with the forum has evolved to a standard that requires the party to have either "continuous and substantial""3 ties with
the forum-so that she would not be burdened greatly by also appearing in litigation there-or isolated contacts with the forum that gave
rise to the litigation itself.3" Under the Court's analysis in World-Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 5 however, not just any litigation-related contacts will do. The contacts must have been initiated by the person
sought to be joined and must be of such a quality that she could not
only have reasonably foreseen their giving rise to litigation in the forum, but could also have anticipated such. 6 Implicit in either a finding
of substantial and continuous or specific, litigation-related contacts with
the forum is a judgment that the party thereby joined had control over
the conduct that created the contacts and, therefore, could have avoided
the litigation by ordering her affairs differently.
In addition to the due process requirement of nexus between the
forum and defendant, procedural due process also requires that a defendant be given adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard. 7 Individual notice through service of process is ordinarily required. If such
notice is impossible or impracticable, notice may be given in some manner "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances," to convey the
required information. 3 In such cases, the form of notice chosen must be
one "not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the
any action growing out of an accident in which the nonresident was involved while
operating the motor vehicle).
:9 See, e.g., Philadelphia & R. Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264 (1917).
0 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
Si Id. at 316.
" See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980);
McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Perkins v. Benquet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
'3 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945).
" See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); see also J.
MoORE, J. LucAs, H. FmK & C. THOMPSON, 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
4.41-1[3] [hereinafter cited as 2 MooRE].
35 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
38 Id. at 297.
37 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
3 Id. at 314.
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feasible and customary substitutes." 9 In Mullane v. CentralHanover
Bank & Trust Co.,' 0 for example, the Supreme Court required individual mailed notice, rather than notice by publication, to beneficiaries of
a common trust where the trustee knew the names and addresses of the
41
beneficiaries.
Due process requirements of personal jurisdiction over and notice
to defendants and other interested parties' 2 are meshed in state longarm statutes.43 A long-arm statute may be viewed primarily as authorization to a forum court to serve notice on defendants or other interested
parties who are not residents of the forum state. But, because it is subject to the limitations of the due process clause," the long-arm statute
may also be viewed as defining the constitutional limits of the forum
court's jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and interested parties.
Despite the merging of personal jurisdiction and notice requirements in
39
40
41

Id.

at 315.

339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Id. at 318-20.

42 As used in this Comment, "interested parties" refers to individuals who could
be joined in a traditional lawsuit under a forum's mandatory or permissive joinder
rules. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (mandatory joinder of necessary parties); FED. R.
Crv. P. 20 (permissive joinder of parties whose claims or potential liabilities arise "out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences" and present a "question of law or fact common to all [plaintiffs or defendants] . . . in the
action").
43 See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW
§ 302 (McKinney 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 855 (1973); see also 2 MOORE,
supra note 34,
4.4111] & 4.41-113].
" See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 289-90
(1980) (Oklahoma long-arm statute tested against constitutional standards); cf. Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 322-25 (1980) (Minnesota garnishment statute scrutinized
under due process clause); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 89 (1978) (personal
jurisdiction provision in California Code of Civil Procedure implicated in due process
analysis); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 190-95 (1977) (Delaware sequestration
statute subjected to constitutional scrutiny).
Some states have explicity incorporated due process into their long-arm statutes.
See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5308, 5322 (Purdon 1981). Writing due process
into a long-arm statute can serve two functions. It can provide a constitutional selfcheck by stipulating that all other provisions of the statute must comport with due
process, or it can act as a constitutional extender by providing that in addition to the
specific long-arm provisions of the statute, a forum court's jurisdiction also reaches to
the fullest extent of due process. The Pennsylvania long-arm statute does both. Section
5308 permits Pennsylvania courts to exercise jurisdiction "only where the contact with
[the] Commonwealth is sufficient under the Constitution of the United States." Section
5322, the long-arm statute itself, provides that in addition to its specific provisions,
Pennsylvania courts may assert jurisdiction over nonresidents "to the fullest extent allowed under the Constitution of the United States . . . based on the most minimum
contact ... allowed under the Constitution." California's long-arm statute simply provides, "A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 1973).
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the fabric of a long-arm statute, the two are not interchangeable.
Neither jurisdiction not notice can substitute for the other, nor does the
existence of one automatically create the other."5
1. Functions of Personal Jurisdiction
In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court outlined the two
principal rationales for the minimum contacts requirement:
[A] state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only so long as there exist "minimum
contacts" between the defendant and the forum State. The
concept of minimum contacts, in turn, can be seen to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions. It protects
the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that the States,
through their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.48
The first function protects the individual liberty interests of those
over whom a court is seeking to assert jurisdiction. 7 As the Supreme
Court wrote in InternationalShoe, "Due process requires that in order
to subject a defendant to judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "' The importance of fairness was reemphasized in Insurance Corporation of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie des Bauxite de Guinee,'4 9 the Court's most recent pronouncement on personal jurisdiction. Thus, a court's ability to assert
personal jurisdiction over a party or parties is a matter of fairness-the
fairness of requiring a party to participate in a suit in a particular
forum or, alternatively, the fairness of binding that party to the out50
come of the suit.
4'See

2 MOORE, supra note 34, at 4.34[2].
444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
47 456 U.S. 694, 702-03 (1982).
48 See InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
48

457, 463 (1940)).
49 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see infra text accompanying note 53.
5 This assumes that the judgment would be given full faith and credit if raised or
attacked in a subsequent proceeding in another state or federal court. See U.S. CONST.
art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982). Lack of jurisdiction over a party whose rights
were adjudicated in the original proceeding would be a ground for attacking the judgment in a later proceeding. See J. MOORE, J. LucAs & T. CURRIER, 1B MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRAcTic
4.05 [4.-] n. 24 and accompanying text (2d ed. 1948) [hereinaf-
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The role of the second function discussed in World-Wide Volkswagen-preservation of state sovereignty-is unclear. The Court's preoccupation with federalism in World-Wide Volkswagen provoked critical commentary 51 and the Insurance Corp. opinion calls into question
whether this consideration retains any validity. Writing for the Court,
Justice White stated, "The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes
and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on
judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty."' 52 In a lengthy footnote, Justice White further
explained,
[O]ur holding today does not alter the requirement that there
be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defendant
and the forum State ....
The restriction on state sovereign
power described in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however,
must be seen as ultimately a function of the liberty interest
preserved by the Due Process Clause. That Clause is the
only source of the personal jurisdiction requirements and the
Clause itself makes no mention of federalism concerns. .... 53
This language makes clear that federalism no longer represents an
independent restraint upon courts' efforts to assert jurisdiction. Rather,
if federalism remains a factor to be considered at all, considerations of
it have been subsumed into considerations for individual liberty interests. Thus, one can conclude that the primary rationale for the personal
jurisdiction requirement is the protection of the liberty interests of defendants or other parties.
2.

Functions of Prejudgment Notice

Notice protects the due process interests of the notified party, who
is thereby informed that an adjudication of her rights is imminent and
who, through notice, is given an opportunity to appear in the proceeding before the court renders judgment." In the words of the Supreme
Court, "'[t]he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opporter cited as 1B

MOORE].

See, e.g., Clermont, Restating TerritorialJurisdictionand Venue for State and
Federal Courts, 66 CoRNE.LL L. REv. 411 (1981); Redish, Due Process, Federalism,
and PersonalJurisdiction:A TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 1112 (1981).
" Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702.
53 Id. at 703 n.10.
' See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
("[Tihe right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the
matter is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or
contest."); 2 MooRE, supra note 34, at 4.02[3]; text accompanying n.22.
"
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tunity to be heard.' "55
Because due process presumes that interested parties will want to
exercise their opportunity for a hearing, 58 actual, timely notice becomes
the constitutional goal. Thus, personal notice early in the litigation is
always adequate,57 and most jurisdictions require personal or mailed
service of process within days or weeks of filing suit.58 Any less effective means of notification, for example, by posting or publication, must
meet the standard articulated in Mullane that "within limits of practicability notice must be such as is reasonably calculated to reach interested parties." 5
Mullane makes clear, however, that the question of whether individual notice is constitutionally required is resolved by balancing the
individual interest sought to be protected by the due process clause
against the interest of the state in adjudicating the suit. Although acknowledging that notice by publication was essentially the equivalent of
no notice,"' the Court in Mullane approved such notice for certain absent parties whose "interests in the common fund [were] so remote as to
be ephemeral.""1 The Court recognized the "practical difficulties and
costs that would be attendant" upon notification of persons whose
whereabouts were unknown. 2
Thus, the constitutional requirements of notice depend upon the
specifics of the case. The notice required varies with the magnitude of
the interests of the parties to be notified and with the magnitude of the
barrier to the proceedings posed by the notice requirement.
5

Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394

(1914)).
"8

Id.

67

See id. at 313.

See, e.g., PA. R. Civ. P. 233 (general rule governing manner of process); PA. R.
Crv. P. 1009 (thirty-day time limit for service of process in assumpsit action); PA. R.
Civ. P. 2079 (ninety-day limit for service on nonresident defendants); cf. FED. R. Civ.
P. 4(a) ("Upon the filing of the complaint the clerk shall forthwith issue a summons..
. ."); FED. R. CIv. P. 4(e) (service of process rule or statute of state in which district
court sits may be applied in lieu of federal rule).
'1 Id. at 318. In Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), for example, the Supreme Court invalidated a Kentucky statute that permitted service of process in forcible
entry and detainer actions by posting a summons in a conspicuous place on the premises if the defendant or an adult member of the defendant's family could not be found
on the premises. The Court observed that many tenants never received actual notice by
this manner because the posted notices were removed by children or other tenants, id.
at 453-54 & n.7, and concluded that notice by mail would have been far more effective,
id. at 455.
6 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315.
61 Id. at 317.
62 Id.
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II.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND NOTICE IN CLASS AcTIoNs

Having identified the interests that animate the procedural due
process requirements in traditional single-party suits, the question
arises whether those interests favor similar requirements in the class
action context. This part of the Comment considers the applicability of
traditional notions of personal jurisdiction and notice to absent plaintiffs involved in class actions.
A.

Minimum Contacts: Ever Appropriate in Class Actions?

Some courts6" and commentators" argue that the same minimum
contacts requirement that limits court jurisdiction in traditional single
party suits should also delimit jurisdiction in class actions. Such a requirement would be appropriate for those types of class actions for
which the requirement would serve the interest that it serves in singleparty suits: protection of the liberty interests of the party over whom
the court seeks to assert jurisdiction. In other words, reliance upon
minimum contacts would be justified for those types of class actions in
which it would be fair for a forum to force a plaintiff to participate in
an action in that forum's courts or, alternatively, to enter a judgment in
her absence.6 5 But, for those types of class actions in which it would be
fair to to assert jurisdiction even in the absence of minimum contacts,
the minimum contacts requirement loses its justification and should not
control.
In what types of class actions, then, does constitutional fairness
require that a plaintiff meet the minimum contacts standard? First, in
those class actions where the plaintiff members must opt into the class 6
or where they can opt out of the class6 7 and have the opportunity to do
so, it would be fair to recognize jurisdiction even if the minimum contacts standard were not satisfied. In such cases, all those in the class
CS

See cases cited supra note 14.

64 See authorities cited supra note 14.
65 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.

Opt-in requirements have been frowned upon under the federal class action
rule, see MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX LITIGATION 18-21 (1973), and were abolished by
the 1966 amendments to the federal rules. Opting in is not expressly provided for under
most state rules. But see PA. R. Civ. P. 1711(b) (court may under "special circumstances" require class members to include themselves in the action).
1 The federal class action rule and most state rules permit class members to exdude themselves or opt out of certain class proceedings by notifying the court in accordance with its instructions. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2); PA. R. Civ. P. 1711(a); c.
N.M. R. Civ. P. 23 (class members not permitted to opt out because class action rule
does not permit court to entertain the "common question" class actions in which other
jurisdictions permit class members to opt out).
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would have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
It would also be fair to recognize jurisdiction in the absence of
minimum contacts in a second group of class actions-actions in which
individual claims were so small that no one would pursue them individually. Miner v. Gillette Co."8 is an example of this type of class action.
The class claims in Miner arose from a promotion run by the Gillette Company, in which the company had offered to supply a "free
Accent Table Lighter" valued at $7.95 in return for proof of purchase
of two "Cricket" lighters and fifty cents for postage and handling. Because of an unexpectedly large response, Gillette ran out of table lighters, leaving 180,000 orders unfilled. Gillette sent letters of apology to
the 180,000 "unsatisfed" customers, along with fifty cents and a free
"Cricket" lighter. Steven Miner, one of the 180,000, filed suit on behalf
of the class, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Illinois
Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act."9
On the issue of personal jurisdiction, the Illinois Supreme Court
recognized an "exception" for class actions, holding that the trial court
could assert jurisdiction over absent plaintiffs even though the minimum contracts standard was not satisfied.70 The court explained, "This
exception is justified when one examines the nature of a class action
suit. Its very purpose is to allow a representative party to pursue the
claims of a large number of persons with like claims. It consequently
71
does not contemplate or necessitate the appearance of absent parties.1
This Comment agrees with the conclusion reached in Miner, although it argues for a different rationale. Rather than waiving the minimum contacts requirement because of the generic aspects of class actions, for example, the purpose of allowing the pursuit of a large
number of like claims,, a court should determine whether such waiver
would be constitutionally fair to the affected plaintiffs by looking at the
size of individual claims in the particular case. In a case like Miner,
where individual claims amount to only a few dollars, a minimum contacts requirement is not justified because the interests the requirement
is intended to protect-the liberty interests of prospective class members-are not threatened.
There remains a final type of class action-that in which plaintiff
class members have substantial individual claims and no right to opt
" 87 Ill.
2d 7, 428 N.E.2d 478, cert. granted, 456 U.S. 914, cert. dismissed, 103
S.Ct. 484 (1982).
69 87 Ill. 2d at 10, 428 N.E.2d at 480. Under the state's consumer fraud statute,
plaintiffs may recover their "actual damages and any other relief which the court deems
proper." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121h, I 270A, § 10a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981).
70 Miner, 87 111. 2d at 12-14, 428 N.E.2d at 481-82.
71 Id. at 14, 428 N.E.2d at 482.
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out. 2 How well would the minimum contacts standard serve the due
process interests of these plaintiff class members?
Arguably, the same contacts that suffice to create jurisdiction over
individual defendants-continuous and substantial contacts with the forum or specific litigation related contacts" -would suffice to establish
jurisdiction over absent class members in these mandatory7' large-claim
class actions.
To the extent a class member has substantial general contacts with
the forum-for example, by regularly vacationing or doing business
there-it would be no great hardship to participate in a class proceeding there, either by corresponding informally with class counsel and the
court or by entering an appearance through personal counsel. Alternatively, to the extent a class member had initiated particular contacts
with the forum that bore significant relation to the subject of the class
litigation, it would be fair to include the class member in the suit because she should have anticipated the lawsuit and altered her conduct
to avoid inclusion."'
While continuous and substantial ties with the forum may be adequate for jurisdiction in all mandatory large-claim class actions, the
suggestion that jurisdiction can be premised upon specific litigationrelated ties with the forum falters in at least two respects when applied
to plaintiff class members involved in these cases. First, few of the isolated contacts an individual initiates with a forum, which in hindsight
can be viewed as giving rise to some cause of action against another
party, are such that at the time they were initiated the individual
should have anticipated being joined in a class action as a result. Individual plaintiffs generally litigate the results of unforeseen rather than
anticipated events-harm caused by a defective product, injury from an
auto accident, monetary losses due to fraud or breach of contract-and
plaintiff class members should be presumed to do the same."
" It was just such potential class plaintiffs who opposed national class certification in the recent IUD products liability litigation (Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 526 F.
Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983)) and in the Hyatt Regency skywalk litigation (In re
Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982)).
For further discussion of these cases, see infra note 118.
73 See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
74 A mandatory class action is one form which the plaintiff class members cannot
opt out. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) (mandatory) and FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2)
(same) with FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (not mandatory).
75 Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (Jurisdiction over nonresident defendant would be fair if defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court [in the forum].").
76

See Note, Multistate PlaintiffClass Actions: Jurisdictionand Certification, 92

HARv. L. Rxv. 718, 732 (1979) ("[Pjlaintiffs are typically passive with respect to the
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Basing jurisdiction on contacts that the party did not anticipate
would violate a principle enunciated in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson: "The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis
...is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State
are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court
there."" For class members whose interests are such as to require that
the court have personal jurisdiction, any less stringent minimum contacts test than that adopted for defendants seems inappropriate.
Second, even if a potential class action plaintiff could anticipate
that a cause of action might arise from her contacts with a particular
forum, the plaintiff would not necessarily be in an economic position to
avoid the contacts. Consider, for example, a Pennsylvania resident who
purchases through a telephone order a defective product that is manufactured by a company in Texas. Although the purchaser might have
anticipated that the product would prove defective, she may have no
alternative but to place the order because the product was a necessity
not available elsewhere. 8 Consider, on the other hand, the defendantmanufacturer's position. When the subject of the litigation is a defective
product, the manufacturer could have altered its behavior and avoided
the lawsuit by making a better product. Alternatively, the defendantmanufacturer could have avoided the litigation in the particular forum
by not initiating contacts with the forum. 9
Thus, the concept of minimum contacts, integral to procedural due
process in the individual party setting, is of limited usefulness in the
class action context. For many types of class actions, a court could asoccurrence from which the lawsuit arises.").

444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
When one considers that one justification for allowing plaintiffs to litigate as a
class is to aggregate their small individual claims and thereby increase their bargaining
power in relation to economically more powerful defendants, see, e.g., Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'y REV. 95 (1974); Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class
Suit, 8 U. CH. L. REv. 684 (1941), it seems even more unrealistic to assume that class
members would have been in an economic position to avoid doing business with the
defendant in the first place.
'9 See World-Wide Volkswagen 444 U.S. at 297 ("The Due Process Clause...
gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to
structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit.").
These assumptions about the relative economic positions of consumers and multistate sellers draw support from Supreme Court acknowledgment that courts may assert
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations that introduce products into the interstate
stream of commerce. Cf id. at 297-98 (corporation that "purposefully avails itself of
the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State" can reduce or eliminate
costs of litigating there by purchasing insurance, passing the costs on to consumers, or
ceasing to do business in the forum completely).
7

78
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sert personal jurisdiction over absent plaiitiff class members, even
though the minimum contacts standard were not met, without violating
the due process rights of those plaintiffs.
Finally, it should be noted that even in those cases where a court
determines that the minimum contacts requirement is appropriate-that is, in the rare cases of mandatory class actions involving substantial individual damage claims 8°-the court should be wary of
adopting too liberal a contact-counting approach.
A recent national shareholder class action brought in New York
provides an example of a case in which a court used a liberal minimum
contacts standard and disregarded the magnitude of the claims of individual plaintiffs. In Katz v. NVF Co.81 the court concluded that "the
minimum contacts test governs all assertions of State jurisdiction," but
suggested that "in the class action context a court can make a determination on whether a nonresident has minimum contacts with the forum
by utilizing a liberal approach." ' The court was not really concerned
with the individual liberty interests of the members of the proposed
class. The opinion does not even mention the size of class members'
individual claims.8
Although the flexible minimum contacts test adopted by the court
in Katz purportedly involved consideration of "the parties, the relief
requested and the unavailability of a more suitable forum for adjudication of the controversy,""M the contacts that satisfied the court were the
defendant corporation's extensive activities in New York and New
York's interest in entertaining the action.85 Such ties, though surely rel8o Cases like Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983), and In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982) (for discussion, see infra note 118), that
involve substantial individual damage claims and no opportunity for class members to
exclude themselves should be rare because most damage class actions would be brought
under federal Rule 23(b)(3)-or an analogous state rule-that permits class members
to opt out.
If the Abed and Skywalk Cases are any indication, the class settings in which a
minimum contacts analysis might prove appropriate would be those involving a limited
fund available for awarding damages to a sizeable number of plaintiffs. There, a court
might be prompted to consider certifying a mandatory class under federal Rule 23(b)(1)
or a state analogue to assure some measure of compensation to all plaintiffs.
81 119 Misc. 2d 48, 462 N.Y.S.2d 975 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
82 Id. at 54, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
83 Id. at 62, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 984. The court did say that class members could opt
out.
"Id. at 54, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 979.
85 Id. at 55, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 980. The factors considered by the Katz court bring
to mind the jurisdictional analysis proposed by Justice Brennan in his opinions in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 219 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan suggested consideration of "the extent of contacts between the controversy, the
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evant, do not constitute minimum contacts as such have been interpreted by the Supreme Court,"6 for they are not the ties between the
parties sought to be joined and the forum state.
Under the analysis proposed by this Comment, the court need not
have demanded a showing of minimum contacts if the individual liberty
interests implicated, as suggested by the size of the individual plaintiff
claims, were not great. However, were the court to determine that minimum contacts were necessary for assertion of jurisdiction, the test
should not be as loose at that adopted in Katz; fairness requires closer
ties between plaintiffs and the forum than those required by the court
in Katz.

B.

7

Notice to Class Members: What Form, When, and Who Pays?

As explained above,88 the chief function of notice in traditional
single-party litigation is to assure the notified party the opportunity to
be heard. In class litigation, notice similarly gives class members the
opportunity for a hearing in cases in which notice informs them that
they have a right to intervene, opt out, or opt in, which they may exercise by responding to the notice.8 9
parties, and the forum state." 433 U.S. at 225. See 444 U.S. at 310.
" The Court has stressed that the relevant contacts are those between the party
sought to be joined in an action-the defendant, usually-and the forum. See, e.g.,
World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291-92.
87 Cf. Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 526 F. Supp. 887, 909 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (observing that "[t]he 'minimum contacts' test .. .varies with the measure of values affected, the costs inflicted by failure to exercise jurisdiction and the facts of each case
before the court," but asserting jurisdiction over national plaintiff class primarily on
premise that class actions are excepted from traditional jurisdictional requirements),
vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817
(1983).
8 See supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
8C
Class notice can serve a second constitutional function when it solicits or "extracts" consent to the court's jurisdiction by informing class members of their right to
opt in or, alternatively, of the consequence of their failure to opt out. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 23 (c)(3) and advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 96 (1969) (inclusion of class
members in a federal Rule 23(b)(3) action is premised upon consent to jurisdiction
theoretically given by a party's failure to opt out); Dam, supra note 21, at 117 (discussing analogous state rules).
Notice to class members also serves a variety of other, nonconstitutional functions.
In any class proceeding, notice can enhance the quality of class representation by informing the court of class members' concerns and of possible intraclass conflicts; it can
also further discovery by soliciting information from class members as to the nature of
their claims; and it can further substantive forum policies of punishing and deterring
wrongful business practices by publicizing the plaintiff class's claims against the defendant. Furthermore, it has been suggested that a costly individual notice procedure,
such as that mandated by the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417
U.S. 156 (1974), for federal class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), acts as a screening device to eliminate frivolous class claims. See Miller, Of FrankensteinMonsters
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Notwithstanding the similar functions notice serves in the singleparty and class action contexts, the notice requirement has very different ramifications for class actions. While a notice requirement in single-party litigation may require notifying a handful of people, a similar
requirement in a class action may entail notification of thousands,*possibly millions, of potential plaintiffs. The difficulty and expense of such
a requirement could threaten the viability of large class actions involving small individual claims."0 This threat leads one to question whether
notice is constitutionally required in all class actions.
Where class members' individual claims are so small that individual plaintiffs are likely to have little or no interest in litigating them
individually, the constitutional justification for prejudgment notice
and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L.
REv. 664, 682 (1979) (Comment) (positive effect of Eisen and other restrictive Supreme Court decisions in federal class actions area is to "encourage[] many plaintiffs'
lawyers to be much more precise and careful" and to "act[] more responsibly than
before").
Regardless of the functions theoretically served by notice to absent class members,
it has been argued that the only real function of notice is that it binds class members to
a judgment. See Dam, supra note 21, at 123; see also Kennedy, supra note 4, at 16-17
(notice requirement for (b)(3) class actions added by 1966 amendment to federal rule is
essentially an opt-out provision conceived at a time when mutuality of estoppel principle still controlled in federal procedure). Under this analysis, the primary beneficiaries
of the notice requirement are the representative plaintiffs, their counsel, and the defendant, who is betting on a binding judgment against the class.
In fact, class members supposedly protected by prejudgment notice are worse off
than they would be under a system of post-judgment intervention similar to that which
prevailed for "spurious" class actions under the old federal class action rule. Class
actions denominated as "spurious" under the 1938 version of Rule 23 were those involving common questions and common relief, but not common "rights" or interests in
the same property. The latter characteristics applied to "true" and "hybrid" class actions, respectively. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98
(1966) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Note]. A member of a spurious class could opt
into the class action after a judgment favorable to the class but was not bound by an
adverse judgment and was free to relitigate the class claim against the same defendant
in a subsequent proceeding. See id. at 99, 105.
A member of a (b)(3) class under the present federal rule is bound by the outcome
of the class suit, favorable or unfavorable, unless the individual opts out beforehand. Id.
at 105-06. In that case, the self-excluded class member may not later opt in when a
favorable judgment is rendered but must institute a new suit against the defendant in
order to recover and will only be able to raise the prior class judgment as preclusive in
a jurisdiction that permits offensive use of collateral estoppel.
90 See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 56. Another commentator has observed that
"death" was in fact the probable result of the Supreme Court's imposition of an individual notice requirement on the named plaintiff in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417

U.S. 156 (1974). Although the Court there left open the possibility that a more narrowly drawn class might be certified on remand, Eisen apparently decided it was economically worthwhile neither to notify the 2,250,000 "easily ascertainable" members of
the original class, see 417 U.S. at 175, nor to litigate on behalf of a substantially
smaller class with substantially smaller aggregate damage claims. See Rutherglen, No-

tice, Scope, and Preclusion in Title VII Class Actions, 69 VA. L. Rav. 11, 28 & n.74
(1983).
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seems to vanish. 9 Due process requires that notice of a pending court
"' Indeed, the prevailing view is that due process does not require prejudgment
notice to members of every plaintiff class. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text. However, commentators differ as to what factors should mitigate the traditional
notice requirement in class actions.
Factors frequently cited as relevant in determining whether notice to class members is constitutionally necessary-and if so, in what form-include the nature and
scope of class relief sought; the cohesiveness of the class; the ability, motivation, and
resources of the class representative and class counsel; the pendency of other individual
or class suits on similar or identical claims; the state policies implicated in the litigation;
and the costs of communicating with the class.
Some courts and commentators stress one or two of these factors. See, e.g., Johnson
v. General Motors Corp., 598 F.2d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1979) (where previous class
action under 23(b)(2) procured only injunctive relief, "due process requires that [notice]
be provided before individual monetary claims may be barred"); Larionoff v. United
States, 533 F.2d 1167, 1186 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (notice not constitutionally required
in federal (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions because "the class generally will be more
cohesive" and "it is less likely that there will be special defenses or issues relating to
individual members of [the] class"), affd, 431 U.S. 864 (1977); Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239, 256 (3d Cir.) (notice to adequately represented (b)(2) class
not constitutionally necessary because "[tihe very nature of a (b)(2) class is that it is
homogeneous without any conflicting interests between members of the class"), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1011 (1975); Frank v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America, 71
Ill. 2d 583, 593, 376 N.E.2d 1377, 1381 (1978) ("[t]o the degree there is cohesiveness
within the class, the need for notice to absent members will tend toward a minimum,"
although notice may be required if there exist questions as to the adequacy of the
representation); Advisory Note, supra note 89, at 106 (need for discretionary notice
minimal where class is cohesive and class representation is adequate); Fisch, supra note
15, at 197 (notice that ensures adequate representation of class as whole is sufficient);
Rutherglen, supra note 90, at 26 (implying that relevant factor in determining appropriate notice is degree of commonality of issues and claims of class members).
Others consider an array of factors. See, e.g., Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380
F. Supp. 945, 958-59 (W.D. Mich. 1974) (notice not required in (b)(2) class actions in
light of cohesiveness of class, substantial cost notice would impose on named plaintiffs,
and administrative burden it would impose on court), rev'd on other grounds, 516 F.2d
902 (6th Cir. 1975); Kamp, Adjudicating the Rights of the PlaintiffClass: Current
ProceduralProblems, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 364, 399 (1982) (suggesting revision of
federal class action rule, substituting flexible notice requirement based on considerations of cost, the interest at stake, and the benefits of intervention); Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 OR. L. REv. 21, 39 (1970) ("[T]ype of notice to be given
should vary with the amount sought in the case, the nature of the claim, the likelihood
of absent class members objecting to the suit or the representation, and the likelihood of
collusion between the defendant and the party plaintiffs."); Developments in the
Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REV. 874, 936,
(1958) ("nature of the class, procedural safeguards, and judicial administration in
granting relief").
Still others suggest balancing the benefits of notice-solicitations of useful information, intervention by class members-against the costs to the class representative, the
class as a whole, and society in general. See Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d
960, 973, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 385 (1975) (individual notice inappropriate where "[t]he
class is huge, the damages per member trifling and the financial burden of the notice
ordered by the.. . court entirely out of proportion to its beneficial results when these
are compared to the purely theoretical risks of a less expensive method of notifying the
class"); Comment, Notice in Rule 23(bX2) Class Actions for Monetary Relief: Johnson
v. General Motors Corp., 128 U. PA. L. RPv. 1236, 1257-58 (1980) (discussing factors
to be taken into account in ordering discretionary notice under 23(d)(2)); cf. McCall,
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action be given to individuals who are likely to have a genuine interest
in participating in the proceeding. One would think, then, that the factor most relevant to determining the necessity, form, and timing of notice to plaintiff class members would be the probability that they would
respond, either by exercising a right to opt in or out, or by requesting
to intervene in the proceeding. Common experience suggests that the
higher the individual stakes92 the more likely that class members would
respond to notice and take advantage of any procedural rights it offers
them.
This Comment argues that imposition of a prejudgment notice requirement should depend upon the size of the individual claims of
plaintiff class members. Consequently, a constitutionally valid class action procedure could provide for no prejudgment notice to plaintiff class
members in class actions where individual damage claims did not exceed a fixed monetary ceiling-perhaps one hundred or two hundred
dollars." Above that ceiling, or where purely equitable relief was
sought, a court could have discretion to require some form of prejudg94
ment notice.
Before requiring that personal or individual notice be sent to class
Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTING L.J. 1351, 1409 (1974) (in consumer class
actions, interest of absent class members in receiving notice "is clearly overbalanced" by
class's interest in access to courts and society's interest in "the therapeutic benefits from
class litigation").
92 Class members' stakes in the litigation need not be monetary. Although difficult
to quantify, the interest of an individual in equitable relief from inferior public education or substandard institutional care is significant. For a thorough discussion of the
problems of class representation in actions for reform of public and private institutions,
see Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1183 (1982).
In class actions in which equitable relief is sought, the size of the individual stakes
may depend upon whether individual class members expect individual relief. See
Rutherglen, supra note 90, at 26-27 ("The appropriate distinction is not between damages ... and injunctions.., but between classwide injunctive relief that restructures
employment practices and any form of individual compensatory relief, whether legal or
equitable.").
9 Cf UNIF. CLAss ACTIONS AcT § 7(d) (1976) (personal or mailed notice to
individual class members required only where individual claims exceed $100); Berry,
Ending Substance's Indenture to Procedure: The Imperative for Comprehensive Revision of the Class Damage Action, 80 COLuM. L. REV. 299, 326 n.184 (1980) (under
Department of Justice proposal for legislative overhaul of federal class action rule,
H.R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), there would be no notice requirement in
"public actions" brought on behalf of 200 or more persons with individual damage
claims of $300 or less); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1982) (under Hart-ScottRodino Antitrust Improvements Act, the only notice required to individuals represented
by state attorney general in parens patriae antitrust damage action is by publication,
unless court finds special circumstances warrant additional notification).
" This could be by publication, by mail to a sample of the class, or, in class
actions brought against regular suppliers of goods or services, by inserts in the defendant's regular mailings to customers.
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members, however, the court should make a finding, supported by evidence, that the individual claims of class members were substantial,
that individual prejudgment notice was the only effective means of informing class members of the pending action, and that the names and
whereabouts of the class members sought to be notified were already
known to the court or could readily be made available. 5 Under such
circumstances, individual notice would be required. In the absence of
such a finding, however, the court could order individual notice at the
request of either party only if that party agreed to finance the costs of
identifying class members and printing and delivering the notice." The
expense of notice found by the court to be constitutionally necessary
would be borne by the class representative or, if necessary to prevent
97
prejudice, by the defendant or the court.
95 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (individual notice required sent to "all members
[of (b)(3) classes] who can be identified through reasonable effort"); Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950) (notice by publication sufficient
as to trust beneficiaries "whose interests or whereabouts could not with due diligence
be ascertained").
As the Supreme Court's treatment in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 417 U.S. 156
(1974), makes clear, such standards of reasonableness may be abused. There, the Court
found the names and addresses of 2,250,000 class members "easily ascertainable," 417
U.S. at 175, and held that individual notice had to be mailed to each, notwithstanding
that the resulting expense to the class representative might well "place impossible or
impractical obstacles in the way" of the class action, see id. at 314. See also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340 (1978) (holding class representative responsible for payment of $16,000 to generate names and addresses of class members for
purpose of sending them (b)(3) notices).
" Such taxing of costs seem fair in light of the parties' likely motivations for
requesting a form of class notice beyond the constitutional minimum. The class representative would wish to define the class as broadly as possible and would be more likely
to persuade a court that the scope of the class was legitimate if class members had been
notified and invited to exclude themselves if their status did not match the class definition. The optimistic defendant, on the other hand, would wish to bind as many class
members as possible to what the defendant anticipated would be a dismissal of the
class's claims, by sending opt-out notices to a broadly defined class and hoping few
exercised their option. In either case, individual notice would serve the strategic interest
of one side or the other, and it would be reasonable to charge for the additional benefit.
" The rule articulated here is one of simplicity and economy. A pretrial hearing
on the merits to allocate notice costs between class representative and defendant, such as
that conducted by the district court and rejected by both the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 168-69, 177-78 (1974),
would prolong the preliminaries of a class action and increase overall class litigation
costs. Because in many cases a fairly limited form of notice would be constitutionally
sufficient, the initial monetary burden on the class representative would not be overwhelming. Furthermore, the class actions in which individual notice would be constitutionally required would be those in which class members' damage claims were substantial, and the class representative presumably would be willing to cover initial expenses
in anticipation of full compensation from a sizeable class judgment.
In any event, this rule would permit courts to shoulder notice costs or transfer
them to the defendant in circumstances in which taxing the class representative would
be unfair. Certainly where, as in the IUD litigation, discussed supra note 72, it was

19841

CLASS ACTIONS

Of course, prejudgment notice requirements could be eliminated
altogether if courts permitted class members to opt in after judgment.
Such one-way intervention, permitted for "spurious" class actions
under the original federal class action rule enacted in 1938,98 was
viewed as unfair to defendants, who, unlike plaintiff class members,
would be bound by a judgment against them. For this reason, among
others, post-judgment intervention was eliminated under the 1966
amendments to the rule; Rule 23(c)(3), which has replaced the spurious
class action, combines mandatory notice with a prejudgment opt-out
provision." Commentators have suggested, however, that a post-judgment intervention procedure would no longer be unfair to defendants in
jurisdictions with liberal collateral estoppel rules.10 0 They argue that if
a plaintiff who opted out would be allowed through collateral estoppel
to raise offensively a prior judgment against the same defendant on a
similar claim, it would be no less fair to the defendant if that plaintiff
were permitted to intervene after judgment in the original
proceeding. 0 1
However, in light of the intent of the revisers of federal Rule 23 to
do away with one-way intervention 0 2 and the adoption by most states
of a class action rule modeled on the federal one, 0 3 it appears unlikely
that the option will find renewed approval in the courts unless legislators and rulemakers amend their class action statutes and rules to provide the option expressly.' " Thus, abandonment of the requirement of
the defendant who moved for class certification, rather than a member of the plaintiff
class, see Abed v. A.H. Robbins Co., 693 F.2d 847, 849 n.2. (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983), it would seem unjust to appoint a class representative
and order her to finance notice to the remainder of the class.
" See Advisory Note, supra note 89, at 99, 105. For a discussion of spurious class
actions, see supra note 89.
99 See Advisory Note, supra note 89, at 105-06.
100 See Dam, supra note 21, at 124; Note, supra note 76, at 734-37.
101 This assumes that, in the absence of a post-judgment intervention procedure,
individuals not included in the class action but having similar claims against the same
defendant would bring separate actions after judgment for the class and could raise the
prior judgment as preclusive. However, relitigation of most consumer class action
claims would be highly unlikely because the costs of bringing suit would far outweigh
the possible recovery for an individual plaintiff. Cf. Dam, supra note 21, at 120 (when
defendant wins, other class members usually will not try to relitigate).
101 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103 Roughly two-thirds of the states have modeled their class action rules on the
1966 amendment to federal Rule 23. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 16, § 1210a (Supp.
1983). The remaining states have patterned their rules either on the 1938 version of the
federal rule or on the 1849 Field Code, see id., or on the Uniform Class Actions Rule
introduced in 1976, see, e.g., IowA R. Civ. P. 42; N.D. R. Civ. P. 23. Two states,
Mississippi and New Hampshire, have no formal class action rule but rely on common
law. See H. NEWBERG, supra note 16, § 1220.
104 In fact, most courts supervising class actions in which class members are per-
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prejudgment notice in small-claim class actions, coupled with adoption
of a presumption that notice need not be given to members of a plaintiff
class, is a more realistic proposal.
Nonetheless, substantial revision would be necessary to bring federal and state class notice rules into conformity with the approach suggested by this Comment.1 0 5 Under federal Rule 23 and the state rules
patterned after it,"' 6 the appropriateness of notice-as well as its form
and timing-is determined not by the magnitude of the class members'
individual claims but by the nature of the class action itself. No prejudgment notice is required for members of classes certified under subsection (b)(1 )107 and (b)(2) 108 of the rule, but "the best notice practicable under the circumstances" must issue to all (b)(3) classes.10 9 "Best
notice practicable," according to the Supreme Court in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,'" means individual notice to "each class member
who can be identified through reasonable effort." ' 1 Ironically, smallclaim class actions are most appropriately brought under state rules
patterned after federal Rule 23(b)(3).
mitted to exclude themselves by notifying the court within a stated time period have
demanded strict compliance with opt-out procedures, presumably to insure the finality
of class judgments. See McCubbrey v. Boise-Cascade Home & Land Corp., 71 F.R.D.
62, 69-70 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (collecting authorities). But see 7A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1787 (1972 & Supp. 1983) (citing
and approving cases that stress liberal opt-out procedures); cf. J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
23.55 n.40 (2d ed. 1948)
(noting cases in which prejudgment notice was delayed and sent to class members with
notice of settlement).
"o See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 103.
10" See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(2) (prescribing notice only for Rule 23(b)(3) actions). Class actions maintainable under Rule 23(b)(1) are those that, in addition to
fulfilling the general prerequisites of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation contained in section (a) of the Rule, would present risks of
inconsistent adjudications or adjudications that would be dispositive of other plaintiffs'
claims or would impair their ability to protect their interests. Such class actions might
typically involve litigation over rights in real property or a limited fund from which to
award damages to several plaintiffs. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1); Advisory Note,
supra note 89, at 100-02.
108 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) (prescribing notice only for Rule 23(b)(3) actions). Class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2) typically involve claims for injunctive
or declaratory relief made on behalf of a group of persons. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2); Advisory Note, supra note 89, at 102.
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). A class action may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)
if, in addition to the general prerequisites contained in section (a), "the court finds that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." FED. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
110 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
111 Id. at 176.
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In contrast to the federal rule, class action rules in four states leave
notice to the complete discretion of the trial judge."' 2 However, the vast
majority take an approach similar to that of the federal rule, 1 3 and
four require notice in all categories of class actions.1 4
Recent cases dramatically illustrate the anomalous results that
present class notice requirements can produce. Abed v. A.H. Robbins
Co."" and In re FederalSkywalk Cases... each involved plaintiffs with
substantial individual claims. In each, certification of a national plaintiff class was proposed under subsection (b)(1)(B) of the federal rule."'
Therefore, had the classes been certified, 1 8 no notice to class members
would have been required, although the court might have ordered some
form of discretionary notice "for the protection of the. . . class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action." '11 9 On the other hand, in
Miner v. Gillette Co.,' 2 0 in which individual class members had eightdollar claims, the Illinois Supreme Court intimated that individual no-

"1'See ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(d); ILL. CODE CIV. P. § 2-803; MD. R.P. 209(c);
MASS. R. Civ. P. 23(d).
113 See supra note 103.
114 See N.D.R. Civ. P. 23(g) (personal notice required only for those members of
class whose claims or liability exceed $100; other forms of notice, such as publication,
sufficient for members with lesser stakes); PA. R. Civ. P. 1712 (notice mandatory, but
type of notice discretionary); Tax. R. Civ. P. 42(c)(2) ("best notice practicable" in all
cases).
112 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated and remanded, 693 F.2d 847
(9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 817 (1983).
116 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982).
117 693 F.2d at 849; 680 F.2d at 1178. Subsection (b)(1)(B) of Rule 23 applies in
cases in which separate adjudications of class members' claims would be dispositive of
the interests of other class members or would "substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B). As discussed in the
Advisory Committee Note to Rule 23, Advisory Note, supra note 89, at 101-02, such a
situation exists when there are insufficient funds available to satisfy the claims of all
potential plaintiffs.
In both Abed and Skywalk, the district courts conditionally certified class actions
under 23(b)(1)(B) because of concern that the defendants lacked sufficient funds to pay
both compensatory and punitive damages to all plaintiffs. See Abed, 693 F.2d at 849;
Skywalk, 680 F.2d at 1178.
118 The Ninth Circuit in Abed vacated the district court's conditional certification
of a national (b)(1)(B) class both because it found the basic prerequisites of
23(a)-commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation-lacking and because
it found the district court had not established that the defendant A.H. Robins's funds
were in fact "limited." See 693 F.2d at 850-52.
The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court's conditional (b)(1)(B) certification of
a class in the Skywalk litigation because it found the certification order effectively enjoined pending state proceedings on the same cause of action but did not fall under one
of the exceptions to the federal Anti-Injunction Act and thus would be in violation of it.
See 680 F.2d at 1180-83.
119 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
120 For a review of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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tice, while not required under the Illinois class action rule,1" 1 would be
constitutionally necessary.122 And in Katz v. NVF Co.,'23 after thoroughly discussing class certification requirements under the New York
rule, finding them satisfied, and certifying the national plaintiff class,
the New York trial court summarily ordered that individual notice be
sent to class members 2 without discussion of the size of the individual
claims, even though the New York class action rule did not require
1 25

notice.

It is ironic that under prevailing class action procedure, no notice
need be sent to class members whose individual tort claims could easily
run into several figures, as was the case in Abed and Skywalk, but that
individual notice would automatically issue to class members with individual claims of only eight dollars, as was the case in Miner. Even
though the Abed and Skywalk plaintiffs would not have been able to opt
out of the proposed (b)(1) class actions.2 . had the classes successfully
been certified, they certainly would have responded to notice and taken
advantage of the opportunity to be heard because of the size of their
individual claims. In both cases, in fact, numerous plaintiffs had already filed individual suits against the defendants, and many partici27
pated actively in opposing class certification.1
Conversely, the small size of the individual claims in Miner and
Katz brings into question the assumption by the courts in those cases
that notice was required in (b)(3)-type actions brought in state courts.
A notice requirement was surely unnecessary in Miner, where the likelihood that individual class members would have any interest in safeguarding their eight-dollar claims was remote.
21 See ILL. CODE CIV. P. § 2-803 ("Upon a determination that an action may be
maintained as a class action, or at any time during the conduct of the action, the court
in its discretion may order such notice that it deems necessary to protect the interests of
the class and the parties.").
122 The court observed that "what notice must be given to absent class members to
satisfy due process necessarily depends upon the circumstances of the individual action," but it found that "in the present circumstances, . . . individual notice is required
in order to insure that each class member's right to pursue his claim is protected." 87
Ill. 2d at 15, 428 N.E.2d at 482.
122 For a discussion of this case, see supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
124 See 119 Misc. 2d at 62, 462 N.Y.S.2d at 984.
125 See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 904(b) (McKinney 1976) (In class actions for
other than injunctive or declaratory relief, "reasonable notice of the commencement of a
class action shall be given to the class in such manner as the court directs."); see also id.
§ 904(c) ("In determining the method by which notice is to be given, the court shall
consider . . . cost .... the resources of the parties and ... the stake of each represented
member of the class . . ").
128 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
127 See supra note 72.
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C. Special Protectionsfor Plaintiff Class Members
As a final matter, it should be noted that while this Comment has
concluded that the traditional safeguards of proedural due process-personal jurisdiction and prejudgment notice-are not appropriate in many types of class actions, plaintiff members of these actions
would not be stripped of all protections. For unlike parties in singleparty suits, class members do not face the dilemma of appearing and
litigating their case or not appearing and suffering a default judgment.
Rather, the interests of absent class members are represented by the
class representative, and, if this representation is not adequate, the absent members can'attack the judgment collaterally.12"
There is another aspect of class actions that mitigates any unfairness that might result from relaxation of personal jurisdiction or notice
requirements. A class member who fails to opt into a class proceeding
in which such was required12 9 and that resulted in a judgment for the
class would not be permitted immediately to share in the class recovery.
But, she may be able to raise the judgment offensively in a subsequent
action against the defendant in a jurisdiction with liberal collateral estoppel rules, 3 0 thereby taking advantage of the favorable judgment.
CONCLUSION

Members of a plaintiff class, depending on their individual stakes
in the class litigation, will be more or less interested in the outcome and
in the proceedings that lead up to it. Because the essential purpose of
the due process clause is to safeguard an individual's interest in a lawsuit, the. due process concerns of class members will vary with their
degree of interest in the case, and due process protections should vary
accordingly.
This Comment has argued that such traditional due process safeguards as a minimum contacts requirement and individual prejudgment
notice are neither completely applicable nor completely inapplicable in
a See, e.g., Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding class
members not bound by prior class suit involving same class because inadequate representation in the prior action denied the class members due process). For a summary of
cases in which the adequacy of class representation has been successfully attacked collaterally, see Schroder, supra note 79, at 952 n.139; see also Note, CollateralAttack on
the Binding Effect of Class Action Judgments, 87 HARV. L. REv. 589 (1974).
129 See supra note 66.
130 See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979) (offensive
use of collateral estoppel permissible in federal courts where plaintiff could not easily
have joined earlier action and use is not otherwise unfair to defendant). See generally
1B MOORE, supra note 50, at 10.405[3].
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the class action setting. Rather, they may be useful in protecting the
interests of class members whose stakes in the class litigation are high
and who therefore would be likely to exclude themselves and pursue
their claims independently if given the opportunity.
Most class actions, however, do not involve such substantial individual claims. In the great number of class actions involving relatively
small individual claims, traditional due process restraints such as minimum contacts or individual notice are unnecessary, and, to the extent
they raise artificial obstacles to the bringing of class suits, they run
contrary to the public policies of vindicating consumers' rights and deterring unfair or illegal practices by large institutions.
Finally, in those class actions in which traditional jurisdiction and
notice requirements are unnecessary, plaintiffs who are included in the
certified class are not without protection. A class action is representative, and those individuals certified within a class can rely on the good
faith and competence of the named plaintiff and class counsel, as well
as on the diligence of the court, to safeguard their interests.

